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Bargaining with the military: how presidents manage the political costs of civilian control/ Andrew Payne

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PAYNE Andrew

Material type: Text

TextPublication details: 2023Subject(s):

In: International Security Vol 48, No 1, Summer 2023, pp.166-207Summary: In an era of increased politicization of the military, there are powerful disincentives for commanders-in-chief to challenge the preferences of the senior military leadership. Even though presidents may have the constitutional "right to be wrong," they require considerable political capital to test that proposition. Dominant normative theories of civil-military relations focus on ideal-type scenarios that do not reflect the messy, inherently political character of elite decision-making.

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Item type	Current library	Call number	Copy number	Status	Date due	Barcode
Journal Article	Mindef Library & Info Centre Journals	MILITARY (Browse shelf(Opens below))	1	Not for loan		70071.1001

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In an era of increased politicization of the military, there are powerful disincentives for commanders-in-chief to challenge the preferences of the senior military leadership. Even though presidents may have the constitutional "right to be wrong," they require considerable political capital to test that proposition. Dominant normative theories of civil-military relations focus on ideal-type scenarios that do not reflect the messy, inherently political character of elite decision-making.

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