Bargaining with the military: how presidents manage the political costs of civilian control/ Andrew Payne
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TextPublication details: 2023Subject(s):
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International Security Vol 48, No 1, Summer 2023, pp.166-207Summary: In an era of increased politicization of the military, there are powerful disincentives for commanders-in-chief to challenge the preferences of the senior military leadership. Even though presidents may have the constitutional "right to be wrong," they require considerable political capital to test that proposition. Dominant normative theories of civil-military relations focus on ideal-type scenarios that do not reflect the messy, inherently political character of elite decision-making.
| Item type | Current library | Call number | Copy number | Status | Date due | Barcode | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Journal Article | Mindef Library & Info Centre Journals | MILITARY (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | 1 | Not for loan | 70071.1001 |
In an era of increased politicization of the military, there are powerful disincentives for commanders-in-chief to challenge the preferences of the senior military leadership. Even though presidents may have the constitutional "right to be wrong," they require considerable political capital to test that proposition. Dominant normative theories of civil-military relations focus on ideal-type scenarios that do not reflect the messy, inherently political character of elite decision-making.
MILITARY
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