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Armed servants: agency, oversight and civil-military relations / by Peter D Feaver

By:

FEAVER Peter D

Material type: Text

TextPublication details: Cambridge, Mass. USA: Harvard Univ Press, 2003Description: 381pISBN:

0674010515 (hbk.):

Subject(s):

UNITED STATES -- CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS

Summary: Develops a new theory of civil-military relations in the United States in which the connection is best conceived as a principal-agent relationship, with the civilian executive directing and monitoring the actions of military agents. This is contrasted with Samual Huntington's professionalism based model of civil-military relations, and suggests that military obedience is not automatic.

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Item type	Current library	Call number	Copy number	Status	Date due	Barcode
Book	Mindef Library & Info Centre On-Shelf	322.50973 FEA (Browse shelf(Opens below))	1	Available		0015353

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Develops a new theory of civil-military relations in the United States in which the connection is best conceived as a principal-agent relationship, with the civilian executive directing and monitoring the actions of military agents. This is contrasted with Samual Huntington's professionalism based model of civil-military relations, and suggests that military obedience is not automatic.

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