Armed servants: agency, oversight and civil-military relations /
FEAVER Peter D
Armed servants: agency, oversight and civil-military relations / by Peter D Feaver - Cambridge, Mass. USA: Harvard Univ Press, 2003 - 381p.
Develops a new theory of civil-military relations in the United States in which the connection is best conceived as a principal-agent relationship, with the civilian executive directing and monitoring the actions of military agents. This is contrasted with Samual Huntington's professionalism based model of civil-military relations, and suggests that military obedience is not automatic.
0674010515 (hbk.): 49.95 USD
UNITED STATES--CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS
Armed servants: agency, oversight and civil-military relations / by Peter D Feaver - Cambridge, Mass. USA: Harvard Univ Press, 2003 - 381p.
Develops a new theory of civil-military relations in the United States in which the connection is best conceived as a principal-agent relationship, with the civilian executive directing and monitoring the actions of military agents. This is contrasted with Samual Huntington's professionalism based model of civil-military relations, and suggests that military obedience is not automatic.
0674010515 (hbk.): 49.95 USD
UNITED STATES--CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS