000			01235cam a2200145 4500
020			_a0275949974 (hbk.)
100		1	_aROBERTSON Scot
245		0	_aThe development of RAF strategic bombing doctrine 1919-1939
260			_aWestport, Conn.: _bPraeger, _c1995
300			_a187p.
440			_aPraeger studies in diplomacy and strategic thought
520			_aThe history of strategic bombing is inextricably intertwined with the history of the Royal Air Force. This book explores the question of doctrinal development in the RAF. It employs a neo-Clausewitzian analysis to reveal that the RAF based the preparation of its strategic bombing force on supposition and hypothesis. Rather than review the evidence of the First World War objectively to determine the fundamental principles of strategic bombing, the RAF adopted a subjective approach. The failure to develop a realistic theory of strategic bombing and to test it through a dialectical process resulted in a lack of attention to the equally necessary element of doctrine. Bomber Command was incapable of carrying out a strategic bombing campaign because it failed in peace to develop the necessary doctrine.
650			_aDOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE RAF
945			_i0002602 _rY _sY
999			_c7387 _d7387