000			01127cam a2200181 4500
100	1		_aYONGHO Kim
700			_aYURIM Yi
245			_aSecurity dilemmas and signalling during the North Korean nuclear standoff
260			_c2005
520			_aA research supported by the 2004 Yonsei Research Fund, Peace Index Project, and BK21 Northeast Asian Peace Project of Yonsei University. This article is a study of North Korea's foreign policy behaviour as a design to project a desired image of a rogue state that is prepared to engage in a high level of risk-taking if Washington and Seoul impose sanctions or refuse concessions. The study signifies that Pyongyang's militant commentaries are not accompanied by actual provocation. In some cases, it even seems that such announcements signal a willingness to negotiate.
650			_aKOREA _xSECURITY DILEMMAS
650			_aNORTH KOREA _xFOREIGN POLICY
650			_aKOREA _xFOREIGN RELATIONS _xUNITED STATES
650			_aNORTH KOREA _xFOREIGN RELATIONS _xSOUTH KOREA
690			_aKorea
773			_aAsian Perspective: _gVol 29 No 3 2005, pp.73-97 (11)
945			_i19462-1001 _rY _sY
999			_c5462 _d5462