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100			_aLARSSON Oscar Leonard _eauthor
245			_aSea blindness in grey zone preparations / _cOscar Leonard Larsson
260			_c2024
520			_aAlthough grey zone and hybrid threats, such as cyberattacks, information campaigns, and sabotage against critical infrastructure, are becoming increasingly common in the contemporary world, relatively little attention has been directed to similar threats in the maritime environment. The recent global pandemic, Russian aggression against Ukraine, the Nord Stream sabotage in 2022, the sabotage of the Finnish-Baltic pipeline in 2023 in the Baltic Sea, as well as drone attacks on shipping in the Persian Gulf are but a few examples that illustrate the fragility of international maritime communications. The present article explores the topic of grey zone and hybrid threats within the maritime environment. Based on an analysis of recent security events, particularly hybrid threats in the maritime environment, the article proposes that it is essential to seek a broader role for naval forces in supporting national sovereignty and international law and order regarding the Open Seas. The article aims to conceptualize and explore the foundations of maritime grey zone threats and the new roles of naval forces operating within this new context, asking whether the UN, through the International Maritime Organization, NATO, and the European Union, suffer from “sea blindness” concerning how they are preparing for the new world order.
650			_aMARITIME SECURITY
650			_aMARITIME FORCES
650			_aGREY ZONES
773			_gDefence Studies: Volume 24, Number 3, September 2024, pages: 399-420
856			_uhttps://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14702436.2024.2359913 _zClick here for full text
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999			_c48114 _d48114