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100			_aROVNER Joshua _eauthor
245			_aHistory is written by the losers: _bstrategy and grand strategy in the aftermath of war / _cJoshua Rovner
260			_c2025
520			_aStrategy is a theory of victory; grand strategy is a theory of security. In the ideal, a state’s strategy and grand strategy are mutually reinforcing. Wartime decisions should leave the state more secure in the aftermath, and peacetime decisions should put the state in a good position in the event of future conflict. Yet for various reasons, strategy and grand strategy often drift apart. This article focuses on one type of decoupling. Victorious states tend to expand their grand strategic ambitions, yet nostalgia encourages them to retain increasingly outmoded strategic concepts. Losers, by contrast, are more likely to have frank conversations about the real opportunities and limits of state power, and the ways in which military action can provide meaningful support. I illustrate the argument with case studies from the British experience in the American War of Independence, and the American experience in the first Persian Gulf War.
650			_aGRAND STRATEGY
650			_aIRAQ WAR
650			_aSTRATEGY
773			_gThe Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume 48, Number 1, January 2025, pages: 5-35
856			_uhttps://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2024.2321604 _zClick here for full text
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