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_aSANKARAN Jaganath _eauthor |
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_aThe failures of Russian Aerospace Forces in the Russia–Ukraine war and the future of air power / _cJaganath Sankaran |
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260 | _c2024 | ||
520 | _aIn the prelude to the 2022 Russia–Ukraine War, American intelligence had concluded the invasion ‘might take a few days longer’ than Russians expected, but not much longer. The Russian Aerospace Forces was expected to eliminate Ukraine’s air defense and pave the way for Russian troops. What explains the failures of the Russian Aerospace Forces to acquire air superiority? I explore three causal factors to understand these failures – Russian military history and its impact on Russia’s air doctrine, Russian intelligence failures, and Ukrainian resolve and innovativeness. I also highlight the causal role played by the United States in sharing critical intelligence. | ||
650 | _aAIR POWER THEORY | ||
650 | _aMISSILES | ||
650 | _aRUSSIA | ||
650 | _aUKRAINE | ||
773 | _gThe Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume 47, Number 6-7, December 2024, pages: 860-887 | ||
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_uhttps://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2024.2345899 _zClick here for full text |
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