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100			_aJANSEN Alies _eAuthor
245			_aUnderstanding security force assistance: _bA matter of control?/ _cAlies Jansen
260			_c2024
520			_aThis article seeks to explain the historically poor performance of the US Department of Defence’s security force assistance (SFA) to state and non-state armed forces to counter terrorism. The article argues that the dominant understanding of SFA as a one-way, top-down relation between a principal (sponsor) and an agent (recipient) has neglected the socio-political dynamics and effects of the intervention. Studying the socio-political processes reveals the messy reality on the ground and how difficult, if not impossible, it is to fully control the operation and the participating recipients. Rather than controlling recipients, this article argues that SFA should be concerned with negotiating the multiple and diverse interests, needs, and priorities. This claim will be substantiated with an in-depth, qualitative case study of Operation Inherent Resolve in Iraq between 2014 and 2018.
598			_aIRAQ, ISLAMIC STATE, OPERATIONAL INHERENT RESOLVE
650			_aSECURITY
650			_aIRAQ
650			_aISLAMIC STATE
773			_gDefense & Security Analysis, Volume 40, Issue 1, 2024, Page: 80-96
856			_uhttps://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2024.2295102 _zClick here for full text
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999			_c47944 _d47944