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100			_aMACHAFFIE James _eAuthor
245			_aOvercoming alliance dilemmas in the collective security treaty organization: _bSignaling fro reputation amid strategic ambiguity/ _cJames MacHaffie
260			_c2024
520			_aThe Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) bills itself as an alliance. It is seen as Russia’s hedge to NATO, yet it often acts in an inconsistent manner vis-a-vis its members when they face crisis situations. These situations are complicated by the fact that the alliance engages in a policy of strategic ambiguity without making a firm commitment to either side of a dispute. Since Russia often acts as a security guarantor on a bilateral level for these states, staying in the alliance may become counterproductive. In order to prevent defection of its members and assuage their fears of abandonment, while maintaining this unofficial policy of strategic ambiguity, and thus help the alliance patron, Russia, avoid entanglement, reassurances are needed. These reassurances come in the form of sunk costs, specifically joint annual military exercise, and the 2022 intervention in Kazakhstan. These sunk costs by the CSTO enhance its reputation for reliability, while maintaining its policy of strategic ambiguity. They reassure its members, assuaging their fear of abandonment, and keeping them invested in the alliance. This will be shown through the use of process tracing in a case study that examines an internal alliance dilemma with two of the organization’s members.
598			_aSECURITY, TREATY, RUSSIA, ALLAINCE, STRATEGIC AMBIGUITY
650			_aTREATY
650			_aRUSSIA
650			_aSTRATEGIC AMBIGUITY
773			_gDefence Studies, Volume 24, Issue 2, 2024, Page: 320-346
856			_uhttps://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2024.2332323 _zClick here for full text
942			_2ddc _cJOURNAL _n0
999			_c47939 _d47939