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100			_aTRIPODI Christian _eAuthor
245			_aHidden hands: _bThe failure of population-centric counterinsurgency in Afghanistan 2008-11/ _cChristian Tripodi
260			_c2024
520			_aThe conflict in Afghanistan 2001–2021 pitched coalition forces into the midst of a civil war. Armed political rebellion of this sort presents practitioners with a deeply intricate problem; multiple, interdependent layers of conflict and competition creating an ever-shifting ecosystem of violent competition. But in their efforts to resolve the root-causes of political rebellion in Afghanistan, Western counterinsurgents unwittingly contributed a set of philosophical, constructionist and cognitive ingredients to the dynamics powering violence on the ground. Using a variety of theoretical approaches, this article explores aspects of the campaign in Helmand and Kandahar 2008–11 in order to better explore the intersection between COIN theory, COIN practice, and the layered complexities involved for stabilisation forces seeking to instrumentalise power and influence in another nation’s internal conflict.
598			_aCIVIL WAR
650			_aAFGHANISTAN
650			_aCOUNTERINSURANGENCY
650			_aCIVIL WAR
650			_aDOCTRINE
650			_aIMPERIALISM
773			_gThe Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume 47, Number 4, August 2024, pages: 545-573
856			_uhttps://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2023.2169673 _zClick here for full text
942			_2ddc _cARTICLE _n0
999			_c47848 _d47848