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100 | _aLYNCH III Thomas F. | ||
245 |
_aThe future of great power competition: _btrajectories, transitions, and prospects for catastrophic war/ _cThomas F. Lunch III |
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260 | _c2024 | ||
520 | _aΤhe dominant geostrategic framework of international relations today is that of a Great Power competition (GPC) among three rivalrous, globally dominant states: the United States, Russia, and China. After more than two decades of mainly cooperation and collaboration, they drifted into de facto competition at the end of the 2000s. By the middle of the 2010s, their undeclared but obvious rivalry intensified. Fully acknowledged GPC arrived in late 2017 when the United States published its National Security Strategy and declared a formal end to the 25-year era of U.S.-led globalization and active American democratization initiatives. | ||
598 | _aINTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, GREAT POWER COMPETITION, NEWARTICLS | ||
650 | _aINTERNATIONAL RELATIONS | ||
650 | _aGREAT POWER COMPETITION | ||
773 | _gJoint Force Quarterly, Volume 2024, Issue 114, pg. 8-23 | ||
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_2ddc _cARTICLE _n0 |
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_c47749 _d47749 |