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100			_aZALA Benjamin
245			_aShould AI stay or should AI go? First strike incentives & deterrence stability/ _cBenjamin Zala
260			_c2024
520			_aHow should states balance the benefits and risks of employing artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning in nuclear command and control systems? I will argue that it is only by placing developments in AI against the larger backdrop of the increasing prominence of a much wider set of strategic non-nuclear capabilities that this question can be adequately addressed. In order to do so, I will make the case for disaggregating the different risks that AI poses to stability as well as examine the specific ways in which it may instead be harnessed to restabilise nuclear-armed relationships. I will also identify a number of policy areas that ought to be prioritised by way of mitigating the risks and harnessing the opportunities identified in the article, including discussing the possibilities of both formal and informal arms control arrangements.
650			_aNUCLEAR DECISION MAKING _xARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (AI)
650			_aSTRATEGIC STABILITY
650			_aARMS CONTROL
773			_gAustralian Journal of International Affairs: Volume 78, Number 2, April 2024, pages: 154-163
856			_uhttps://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10357718.2024.2328805 _zClick here for full text
942			_2ddc _cARTICLE _n0
999			_c47378 _d47378