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100			_aFANLO Abby
245			_aThe disadvantage of nuclear superiority/ _cAbby Fanlo and Lauren Sukin
260			_c2023
520			_aWhen crises occur between nuclear-armed states, do relative nuclear capabilities affect the outcome? The literature offers no consensus about nuclear superiority’s effect on crisis victory, but this article demonstrates that this effect depends on the size of the disparity between states’ nuclear arsenals. Although superiority is correlated with victory in crises between states with similarly sized nuclear arsenals, superiority provides no advantage in asymmetric crises. Because a vastly inferior state risks annihilation in a nuclear conflict, it will acquiesce to an opponent’s demands before the crisis occurs, unless backing down implies an existential threat as well. Given an asymmetric crisis has emerged, therefore, the inferior side will be willing to bid up the risk of nuclear war, deterring superior opponents. Using quantitative analyses of crisis data, this article shows that the positive association between nuclear superiority and crisis victory decreases as the disparity between competing states’ arsenals increases.
650			_aNUCLEAR WEAPONS _xCRISIS _xPOLITICS
700			_aSUKIN Lauren
773			_gSecurity Studies, Vol 32, Number 3, June-July 2023, page: 446-475.
856			_uhttps://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09636412.2023.2225779 _zClick here for full text
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