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100 | _aMICHAELS Eva | ||
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_aCaught off guard? Evaluating how external experts in Germany warned about Russia’s war on Ukraine/ _cEva Michaels |
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520 | _aWhile Germany’s response to the Russo-Ukrainian war continues to be intensely scrutinised, with much attention focusing on the Zeitenwende debate and Berlin’s reluctance to pull its weight in NATO, we know little about how Germany anticipated the outbreak of war. The picture that has emerged is one of significant surprise among German policymakers when Russia invaded Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Germany’s foreign intelligence service (Bundesnachrichtendienst, BND) has been criticised for failing to issue strong warnings, whereas BND officials have argued that their warnings went unheeded. This article contributes to discussions of what intelligence producers and policymakers could have been expected to know by exploring how selected external experts in Germany warned about a Russian attack on Ukraine. | ||
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_aRUSSO-UKRAINIAN WAR _zUKRAINE _zRUSSIA |
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773 | _g Intelligence and National Security, Volume 39, Number 3, April 2024, page: 420-442 | ||
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_uhttps://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02684527.2024.2330133 _zClick here for full text |
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