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100			_aITAI Shapira
245			_aThe Yom Kippur intelligence failure after fifty years: _bwhat lessons can be learned?/ _cItai Shapira
260			_c2023
520			_aExtensive research has been published about the failure of Israeli intelligence in the Yom Kippur War in 1973, mainly in the context of flawed analysis and strategic surprise. Fifty years after the war, the current article uses an intelligence studies lens to describe major lessons which can be learned from this failure of early warning. Such lessons include the required focus of strategic intelligence on identifying change rather than continuity, the need for explicit analytical methodology beyond inductive reasoning, the importance of integrating assessment of adversary intentions and capabilities, the risk of over-reliance on raw information, and the need for a culture encouraging contrarian thinking.
650			_aINTELLIGENCE FAILURE _xINTELLIGENCE METHODOLOGY
773			_gIntelligence and National Security, Volume 38, Number 6, October 2023, page: 978-1002
856			_uhttps://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02684527.2023.2235795 _zClick here for full text
942			_2ddc _cARTICLE _n0
999			_c47147 _d47147