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100			_aMILLER Nicholas L.
245			_aThe rise of the autocratic nuclear marketplace/ _cNicholas L. Miller and Tristan A. Volpe
260			_c2023
520			_aThe United States established itself as the dominant supplier of civil nuclear technology in the 1960s. But Moscow soon caught up, supplanting Washington after the Cold War. What led to the rise of this autocratic nuclear marketplace? We identify two factors. First, polarity shapes the motives for states to pursue civil nuclear exports. The superpowers faced strong motivations under bipolarity, but unipolarity put greater pressure on Russia to compete for influence with nuclear exports. Second, regime type affects state capacity to execute this strategy. We find that Moscow enjoyed an autocratic advantage, which insulated its nuclear industry from domestic opposition.
598			_aECONOMIC STATECRAFT, NUCLEAR TRADE, NONPROLIFERATION, NEWARTICLS
650			_aECONOMIC STATECRAFT _xNUCLEAR TRADE
700			_aVOLPE Tristan A.
773			_gThe Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume 46, Number 6-7, December 2023, page: 1325-1363
856			_uhttps://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2022.2052725 _zClick here for full text
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