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100			_aROD Thornton
245			_aLearning the lessons of COVID-19: _bhomeland resilience in the United Kingdom - is it now time for both a dedicated civil defense organization and a paramilitary force?/ _cThornton Rod and Marina Miron
260			_c2023
520			_aThe United Kingdom’s homeland resilience capacity is poor. The COVID-19 pandemic proved this. Back in 2019, the UK had been labeled as the best prepared country in the world for a pandemic. And yet, by 2020, and once COVID-19 had struck, the UK became “unequivocally” the hardest hit country in Europe – particularly in terms of excess mortality. In this article it is argued that the UK’s continental neighbors coped better than the UK because they had better homeland resilience capacity. This was provided by their having civil defense organizations, paramilitary forces and militaries which are specifically designed to contribute to homeland emergencies. The UK, in contrast and almost uniquely in the world, lacks both civil defense and paramilitary bodies and, moreover, it has armed forces that are not actually structured to provide help in domestic emergencies. Given the problems highlighted during COVID-19, is it now time for the UK to set up its own bodies specifically tasked with alleviating domestic emergencies? This article explores this question by comparing the UK’s pandemic response with that of Spain – a country which, according to all available data, should have performed worse than the UK. But it did not. Why?
598			_aHOMELAND RESILLIENCE, UK DEFENSE POLICY, COVID-19, NEWARTICLS
650			_aHOMELAND RESILIENCE _xUK DEFENSE POLICY _xCOVID-19
700			_aMIRON Marina
773			_gDefence Studies (Journal of Military and Strategic Studies), Volume 23, Number 1, March 2023, page: 105-125
856			_uhttps://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14702436.2022.2110481 _zClick here for full text
942			_2ddc _cARTICLE _n0
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