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100			_aCIMBALA Stephen J.
245			_aHypersonic weapons and nuclear deterrence/ _cStephen J. Cimbala and Adam Lowther
260			_c2022
520			_aThis study explores the relationships between hypersonic weapons and nuclear deterrence. This relationship is fraught with uncertainty because the velocity of innovation in hypersonics is difficult to forecast. Nevertheless, major nuclear powers are developing hypersonic weapons, including some that can be deployed on intercontinental launchers. Hypersonic glide vehicles or cruise missiles could threaten first strike stability by reducing the time for responsive decision making in the face of perceived threats, or by evading antimissile defenses otherwise competent to deflect attacks. Attacks on space based assets and cyberattacks, combined with hypersonic missiles, could pose unacceptable risks to assured retaliation based on an assumed number of survivable launch platforms. On the other hand, analysis suggests that, in the case of the United States and Russia, going forward, strategic nuclear deterrents with currently projected modernization plans should suffice to maintain deterrence and first strike stability, barring unforeseen developments in breakthrough technologies.
598			_aHYPERSONIC WEAPONS, NEWARTICLS
650			_aHYPERSONIC WEAPONS
700			_aLOWTHER Adam
773			_gComparative Strategy, Volume 41, Numbers 1-6, 2022, page: 282-295
856			_uhttps://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01495933.2022.2057736 _zClick here for full text
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