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100			_aLUPOVICI Amir
245			_aDeterrence by delivery of arms: _bNATO and the war in Ukraine/ _cAmir Lupovici
260			_c2023
520			_aDuring the course of the war in Ukraine, various actors have employed a unique type of deterrence by denial: namely, the threat to deliver arms. NATO leaders have committed—through rhetoric and deeds—to continue to deliver weapons to Ukraine if Russia escalated the war in order to deny Russian success. Not only is this type of strategy undertheorized, but it also challenges the distinction between direct and extended deterrence that has been central to deterrence scholarship. In deterrence by delivery of arms, the patron deters not by threatening to fight or deploy forces, but by committing to send weapons.
598			_aNATO, UKRAINE, RUSSIA, NEWARTICLS
650			_aNATO
650			_aUKRAINE
650			_aRUSSIA
773			_gContemporary Security Policy, Vol 44, No 4, October 2023, page: 624-641
856			_uhttps://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13523260.2023.2256572 _zClick here for full text
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