| 000 | 01446cam a2200193 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 100 | 1 | _aKARLEN Niklas | |
| 700 | _aRAUTA Vladimir | ||
| 245 |
_aDealers and brokers in civil wars: _bwhy states delegate rebel support to conduit countries/ _cNiklas Karlen and Vladimir Rauta |
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| 260 | _c2023 | ||
| 520 | _aExternal state support to non-state armed groups is commonly seen as a direct relationship between a state sponsor and a rebel group. But powerful states often use third-party states as conduits of military aid. These intermediary states are secondary, subordinate principals that are part of extended chains of "dual delegation." Because intermediaries are likely to have their own separate agendas, powerful states often face a double principal-agent problem when providing material support to rebel groups. The difficulties and problems associated with controlling the agent are reflected in the relationship between the principal and the intermediary. States need to identify the alignment of interests at an early stage, or risk strategic failure. | ||
| 650 | _aINSURGENCY | ||
| 650 |
_aCONFLICT _xWAR |
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| 650 | _aLOGISTICS | ||
| 650 |
_aSUPPLY _xDEMAND |
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| 773 |
_aInternational Security : _gVol 47, No 4, Spring 2023, pp.107-146 (68) |
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| 598 | _aINSURGENCY | ||
| 856 |
_uhttps://direct.mit.edu/isec/article/47/4/107/115922/Dealers-and-Brokers-in-Civil-Wars-Why-States _zClick here for full text |
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| 945 |
_i69822.1001 _rY _sY |
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| 999 |
_c42887 _d42887 |
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