000			01870cam a2200205 4500
100	1		_aDALTON Toby
700			_aKIM Jina
245			_aRethinking arms control with a nuclear North Korea/ _cToby Dalton & Jina Kim
260			_c2023
520			_aThree decades of efforts to secure North Korea's denuclearisation failed to arrest Pyongyang's development of a nuclear arsenal. With growing dangers of conflict escalation and nuclear use, it is time to consider alternative policies that address the reality of North Korea as a nuclear possessor state. Comprehensive arms control is worth exploring as one potential approach to managing nuclear dangers on the Korean Peninsula. Previously, conventional arms-control and denuclearisation negotiations with North Korea proceeded in parallel. However, the increasing complexity of deterrence resulting from changes in military capabilities, especially in South Korea, now necessitates a comprehensive process that creates linkages across conventional and strategic domains to address not just North Korean and South Korean, but also US, capabilities. Though comprehensive arms control promises to be politically fraught and technically complex, policymakers and experts should debate whether it could yield a more secure Korean Peninsula than existing policies that have long since failed.
650			_aSOUTH KOREA _zNORTH KOREA _zKOREAN PENINSULA
650			_aDENUCLEARISATION _xARMS CONTROL _xDETERRENCE _xNON-PROLIFERATION
650			_aDISARMAMENT _xARMS RACES _xSECURITY SPIRAL
650			_aTACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS _xSIX-PARTY TALKS
650			_a1994 AGREED FRAMEWORK
773			_aSurvival: Vol.65, No.1, February-March 2023, pp.21-48 (106)
598			_aKOREA, WMD, SECURITY
856			_uhttps://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00396338.2023.2172847 _zClick here for full text
945			_i69449.1001 _rY _sY
999			_c42509 _d42509