000 | 01952cam a2200193 4500 | ||
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100 | 1 | _aHUYNH Tam-Sang | |
245 |
_aBolstering middle power standing: _bSouth Korea's response to U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy from Trump to Biden/ _cTam-Sang Huynh |
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260 | _c2023 | ||
520 | _aSouth Korea's reluctant response to the U.S. Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy so far has failed to send a clear-cut signal to regional countries. Despite upholding multilateralism as the cornerstone of its middle power diplomacy, South Korea has not worked in line with Indo-Pacific second-size powers given Seoul's relatively vague response to the Indo-Pacific structure. With foreign policy shifts from Trump to Biden, South Korea may be well-positioned to communicate its policies with a more nuanced response to the Indo-Pacific. To leverage Seoul's middle power standing and its commitment to multilateralism, the Moon Jae-in administration can be expected to reflect on clearer definitions of what 'Indo-Pacific' means and come up with a more comprehensive understanding of multilateral cooperation in the region so as not to mistake 'Indo-Pacific' for its security connotation. As for South Korea, pursuing a three-headed strategy, for example, continuing to position itself in the Indo-Pacific region as a balancer, enhancing ties with like-minded middle powers, and deepening the South Korea-ASEAN relationship, could accommodate Seoul's interests and concerns amid the U.S.-China strategic competition and the COVID-19 pandemic. | ||
650 | _aCOVID-19 | ||
650 | _aMIDDLE POWER | ||
650 | _aMULTILATERALISM | ||
650 | _aSOUTH KOREA | ||
650 | _aU.S. INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY | ||
773 |
_aThe Pacific Review : _gVol. 36, No 1, January 2023, pp. 32-60 (103) |
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598 | _aCOVID-19, KOREA, INDO-PAC, USA, STRATEGY | ||
856 |
_uhttps://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09512748.2021.1928737 _zClick here for full text |
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