000 | 01443cam a2200217 4500 | ||
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100 | 1 | _aTONNESSON Stein | |
700 | _aOO Min Zaw | ||
700 | _aAUNG Ne Lynn | ||
245 |
_aNon-inclusive ceasefires do not bring peace: _bfindings from Myanmar/ _cStein Tønnesson, Min Zaw Oo & Ne Lynn Aung |
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260 | _c2022 | ||
520 | _aBased on conflict data, interviews and media monitoring, this study of Myanmar's non-inclusive ceasefires develops a four-step argument about the effect of ceasefires in complex conflict systems. First, non-state armed groups rarely co-ordinate their actions strategically. This makes it easy for governments to obtain ceasefires with some groups while fighting others. Second, when ceasefires ensure armed groups' survival, they mostly hold. Third, non-inclusive ceasefires do not reduce a country's overall level of violence, since fighting tends to escalate with excluded groups. On this basis we conclude that non-inclusive ceasefires do not present a viable alternative to an inclusive peace process. | ||
650 | _aMYANMAR | ||
650 | _aCEASEFIRE | ||
650 | _aPEACE AGREEMENTS | ||
650 | _aARMED CONFLICT | ||
650 | _aARMED POLITICS | ||
773 |
_aSmall Wars & Insurgencies: _gVol. 33, No.3, April 2022, pp. 313-349 (97) |
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598 | _aBURMA, PROXYWAR, CONFLICT, POLITICS | ||
856 |
_uhttps://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09592318.2021.1991141 _zClick here for full text |
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945 |
_i69355.1001 _rY _sY |
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999 |
_c42428 _d42428 |