000 | 01700cam a2200205 4500 | ||
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100 | 1 | _aBARA Corinne | |
700 | _aKREUTZ Joakim | ||
245 |
_aTo buy a war but sell the peace? _bmercenaries and post-civil war stability/ _cCorinne Bara & Joakim Kreutz |
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260 | _c2022 | ||
520 | _aPrivate military and security companies (PMSCs) and mercenaries are a common feature in civil wars, yet little systematic analysis of PMSC involvement and conflict dynamics exists. This article explores whether civil conflicts that feature PMSC forces in combat are more likely to recur. We contend that the presence of PMSCs in fighting exacerbates the postwar credible commitment problem, as belligerents will be concerned about the possibility to redeploy such forces in the future. Belligerents pay more attention to more recent and more visible information, meaning that the effects should be greatest if PMSCs feature extensively in combat and at the end of the conflict. A duration analysis of data from the Private Security Events Database and Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 1990-2014, offers robust support for these claims. Our results suggest that conflict management should consider aspects beyond the local context as risk factors for civil war recurrence. | ||
650 | _aSECURITY | ||
650 | _a"GUNS FOR HIRE" | ||
650 | _aCIVIL WAR | ||
650 | _aCIVIL WAR RECURRENCE AFTER COMPLEX CONFLICT SETTINGS | ||
650 | _aPEACEMAKING IN THE SHADOW OF MERCENARIES | ||
773 | _aSecurity Studies : Vol.31, No.3, June-July 2022 pp.417-445 (118) | ||
598 | _aSECURITY | ||
856 |
_uhttps://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09636412.2022.2097890 _zClick here for full text |
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945 |
_i69273.1001 _rY _sY |
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999 |
_c42355 _d42355 |