000 | 02052cam a2200205 4500 | ||
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100 | 1 | _aCALCARA Antonio | |
700 | _aGILLI Andrea | ||
700 | _aGILLI Mauro | ||
700 | _aZACCAGNINI Ivan | ||
245 |
_aWill the drone always get through? _boffensive myths and defensive realities/ _cAntonio Calcara, Andrea Gilli, Mauro Gilli & Ivan Zaccagnini |
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260 | _c2022 | ||
520 | _aDo emerging and disruptive technologies yield an offensive advantage? This is a question of central theoretical and substantive relevance. For the most part, however, the literature on this topic has not investigated empirically whether such technologies make attacking easier than defending, but it has largely assumed that they do. At the same time, work on the offense-defense balance has primarily focused on land conflicts, thus offering little understanding of the effect of technological change in other domains, such as the air and sea. In this article we address these gaps by investigating whether current- and next-generation drones shift the offense-defense balance toward the offense or toward offense dominance, as many assume-that is, whether drone technology can or will defeat current- and next-generation air defense systems. To answer these questions, we have explored the literature in radar engineering, electromagnetism, signal processing, and air defense operation. Our analysis challenges the existing consensus about the present and raises questions about the future. Our findings also demonstrate how important it is for the field of security studies to embrace greater interdisciplinarity in order to explore pressing policy and theoretical questions. | ||
650 | _aSECURITY | ||
650 | _aDRONE WARFARE | ||
650 | _aNEXT-GENERATION DRONES AGAINST NEXT-GENERATION AIR DEFENSES | ||
773 |
_aSecurity Studies : _gVol.31, No.5, November-December 2022 pp.791-825 (118) |
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598 | _aSECURITY, POLICY, WARFARE | ||
856 |
_uhttps://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09636412.2022.2153734 _zClick here for full text |
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