000			01915cam a2200217 4500
100	1		_aWEBER Shlomo
700			_aWEBER Y. Weber
700			_aWIESMETH H. Wiesmeth
245			_aHierarchy of membership and burden sharing in a military alliance/ _cShlomo Weber, Y. Weber & H. Wiesmeth
260			_c2021
520			_aWe examine a military alliance with heterogeneous members that finances the production of the 'alliance good' (defense, deterrence, and peacekeeping) through its members' voluntary contributions. To examine the patterns of those contributions, we introduce a decision-making model with three layers of hierarchy: one 'super-leader', a group of 'leaders', and several 'followers', which takes into account different economic and historical backgrounds of member states. The asymmetric interaction between the members is reflected by the choice of Stackelberg paradigm where the sequence of countries' moves is determined by their alliance status. We then apply Penrose's Law to incorporate countries' heterogeneous population sizes in our model and show the existence of a unique Penrose-Stackelberg equilibrium. We apply our results to NATO and offer an empirical evaluation of burden sharing across the alliance by showing how economic characteristics, alliance 'awareness', and the alliance status explain the patterns of members' contributions. We also evaluate the optimal fit between the data and an appropriate choice of the alliance's hierarchical structure.
650			_aALLIANCES
650			_aPUBLIC GOODS
650			_aBURDEN SHARING
650			_aFREE RIDING
650			_aMULTI-TIER PENROSE-STACKELBERG EQUILIBRIUM _xNATO
773			_aDefence and Peace Economics: _gVol 32, No. 8, December 2021, pp.903-926
598			_aMILITARY, NATO
856			_uhttps://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10242694.2020.1782584 _zClick here for full text
945			_i69115.1001 _rY _sY
999			_c42210 _d42210