000			01794cam a2200205 4500
100	1		_aSCHIEVELS Jelte Johannes
700			_aCOLLEY Thomas
245			_aExplaining rebel-state collaboration in insurgency: keep your friends close but your enemies closer/ _cJelte Johannes Schievels & Thomas Colley
260			_c2021
520			_aThis article endeavours to take the first step in developing a comprehensive theory by analysing rebel-state collaboration in two heuristic case studies: Afghanistan and Syria. Through process tracing, we find four mechanisms that can explain collaboration: 1) to prevent a costly military stalemate, 2) to gain or maintain legitimacy, 3) because external threats incentivise a mutually beneficial alliance, and 4) because both have to operate under the constraints of the pre-existing political economy. The relative weight of each varies, reflecting the fluid and contextual nature of wartime political orders. Contrasting with more popular explanations, we argue rebels and states are willing to collaborate even when the other benefits too, providing they believe their relative gains would be higher than their opponents, or the costs of competing would be too large. In providing a fuller explanation of rebel-state collaboration, we advocate a rethink about how to capture and analyse the complex and dynamic interactions between rebels and states.
650			_aINSURGENCY
650			_aREBEL-STATE COLLABORATION
650			_aCIVIL WAR
650			_aAFGHANISTAN
650			_aSYRIA
773			_aSmall Wars & Insurgencies: _gVol. 32, No.8, December 2021, pp. 1332-1361 (97)
598			_aAFGHAN, INSURGENCY
856			_uhttps://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09592318.2020.1827847 _zClick here for full text
945			_i69009.1001 _rY _sY
999			_c42104 _d42104