000			01816cam a2200145 4500
100	1		_aJOHNSON James
245			_aDelegating strategic decision-making to machines: _bDr. Strangelove Redux?/ _cJames Johnson
260			_c2022
520			_aWill the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in strategic decision-making be stabilizing or destabilizing? What are the risks and trade-offs of pre-delegating military force to machines? How might non-nuclear state and non-state actors leverage AI to put pressure on nuclear states? This article analyzes the impact of strategic stability of the use of AI in the strategic decision-making process, in particular, the risks and trade-offs of pre-delegating military force (or automating escalation) to machines. It argues that AI-enabled decision support tools - by substituting the role of human critical thinking, empathy, creativity, and intuition in the strategic decision-making process - will be fundamentally destabilizing if defense planners come to view AI's 'support' function as a panacea for the cognitive fallibilities of human analysis and decision-making. The article also considers the nefarious use of AIenhanced fake news, deepfakes, bots, and other forms of social media by non-state actors and state proxy actors, which might cause states to exaggerate a threat from ambiguous or manipulated information, increasing instability.
650			_aARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE _zU.S.-CHINA RELATIONS _xNUCLEAR SECURITY _xDETERRENCE POLICY _xEMERGING TECHNOLOGY _xSTRATEGIC STABILITY
773			_aThe Journal of Strategic Studies : _gVol 45 No.3, June 2022, pp. 439-477 (98)
598			_aINTEL, USA, CHINA, SECURITY, POLICY, TECHNOLOGY
856			_uhttps://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2020.1759038 _zClick here for full text
945			_i67444.1001 _rY _sY
999			_c41498 _d41498