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100	1		_aBYUN Joshua
245			_aRegional security cooperation against hegemonic threats: _btheory and evidence from France and West Germany (1945-65)/ _cJoshua Byun
260			_c2022
520			_aWhy do some regional powers collectively threatened by a potential hegemon eagerly cooperate to ensure their security, while others appear reluctant to do so? I argue that robust security cooperation at the regional level is less likely when an unbalanced distribution of power exists between the prospective security partners. In such situations, regional security cooperation tends to be stunted by foot-dragging and obstructionism on the part of materially inferior states wary of facilitating the strategic expansion of neighbours with larger endowments of power resources, anticipating that much of the coalition's gains in military capabilities are likely to be achieved through an expansion of the materially superior neighbour's force levels and strategic flexibility. Evidence drawn from primary material and the latest historiography of France's postwar foreign policy towards West Germany provides considerable support for this argument. My findings offer important correctives to standard accounts of the origins of Western European security cooperation and suggest the need to rethink the difficulties the United States has encountered in promoting cooperation among local allies in key global regions.
650			_aREGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION _xHEGEMONIC THREATS _xBALANCE OF POWER _zFRANCE _zWEST GERMANY
773			_aEuropean Journal of International Security : _gVol 7 Issue 2, May 2022, pp.143-163 (27A)
598			_aSECURITY, EUROPE
856			_uhttps://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-journal-of-international-security/article/abs/regional-security-cooperation-against-hegemonic-threats-theory-and-evidence-from-france-and-west-germany-194565/87BD2D99CFE014E470613FE242DFDC15 _zClick here for full text
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