000			01963cam a2200157 4500
100	1		_aBROWN Joseph M.
700			_aFAZAL Tanisha M.
245			_a#SorryNotSorry: Why states neither confirm nor deny responsibility for cyber operations/ _cJoseph M. Brown and Tanisha M. Fazal
260			_c2021
520			_aStates accused of perpetrating cyber operations typically do not confirm or deny responsibility. They issue 'non-denial denials' or refuse to comment on the accusations. These ambiguous signals are prevalent, but they are largely ignored in the existing cyber literature, which tends to treat credit claiming as a binary choice. The ambiguity of non-denial denials and 'non-comments' allows states to accomplish two seemingly opposed goals: maintaining crisis stability and leaving open the possibility of their involvement in the attack. By deliberately remaining a suspect, a state can manipulate rivals' perceptions of its cyber capability and resolve. Refusing to deny responsibility can also shape rivals' perceptions of allies' capabilities, enhancing the credibility of deterrence. All of this can be accomplished without the escalatory risks that would come with an explicit admission of responsibility. Where previous research has focused on the dangers of escalation and the limitations of costly signalling with cyber, we show that non-denial denials and non-comments make cyber operations considerably more useful than the literature appreciates.
650			_aCYBER CONFLICT _xCOERCION _xSIGNALLING _xINTELLIGENCE _xDETERRENCE
773			_aEuropean Journal of International Security : _gVol 6 Issue 4, November 2021, pp.401-417 (27A)
598			_aCYBERSEC, INTEL
856			_uhttps://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-journal-of-international-security/article/abs/sorrynotsorry-why-states-neither-confirm-nor-deny-responsibility-for-cyber-operations/85A08DAB9C058D3C2DF1DBD962BC01C5 _zClick here for more
945			_i66843.1001 _rY _sY
999			_c40962 _d40962