000			01026cam a2200157 4500
100	1		_aKIM Wukki
245			_aResident terrorist groups, military aid, and moral hazard: further empirical analysis/ _cWukki Kim, Dong Li & Todd Sandler
260			_c2021
520			_aThe current article improves on the empirics of the pioneering article by showing that the moral-hazard concerns extend to other major donors - the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Additionally, military assistance given by a collective of countries to host countries greatly reduces the moral hazard but does not eliminate it. Moreover, policy alignment or affinity between a major donor and the host aid-recipient country does not generally augment resident terrorist groups' survival.
650			_aMORAL HAZARD
650			_aMILITARY AID
650			_aTERRORIST
773			_aDefence and Peace Economics: Vol 32, No. 1, January 2021, pp.1-17
856			_uhttps://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2019.1709783 _z click for text
945			_i65949-1001 _rY _sY
999			_c40133 _d40133