| 000 | 01256cam a2200169 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 100 | 1 | _aKOCH Susan | |
| 700 | _aSCHEBER Thomas | ||
| 245 |
_aSecuring compliance with arms control agreements/ _cSusan Koch and Thomas Scheber |
||
| 260 | _c2019 | ||
| 520 | _aThis report goes one step further by not only explaining why some countries or leaders chose not to comply, but also what lessons we have, or we should have, learned from these historical case studies to apply to today's compliance concerns. The cases studied in this report vary in antagonists, interests and objectives of the parties, time periods, agreements transgressed, military capabilities subject to limits, types of violations, evasion tactics, enforcement measures, means to resist cheating penalties, and outcomes. One case deals primarily with conventional forces, two with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, and one with a non-offensive capability (an illegal radar). | ||
| 650 | _aARMS CONTROL | ||
| 650 |
_aCOMPLIANCE _xARMS CONTROL |
||
| 650 | _aCASE STUDIES | ||
| 773 |
_aComparative Strategy: _gVol.38, No.1, 2019, pp.1-87 (113) |
||
| 856 |
_uhttps://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01495933.2019.1559637 _zClick link for online access |
||
| 945 |
_i64857-1001 _rY _sY |
||
| 999 |
_c39100 _d39100 |
||