000			01598cam a2200193 4500
100	1		_aPRẺMONT Karine
700			_aDAVID Charles-Philippe
700			_aBOUCHER Vincent
245			_aThe clash of historical analogies and their influence on decision-making: the case of Iraqi reconstruction under George W. Bush/ _cKarine Prẻmont, et.al
260			_c2018
520			_aContrary to the conventional wisdom in the literature on United States foreign policy, there was no consensus within the George W. Bush Administration on the parallel between the reconstruction of Iraq and that of post-Second World War Germany and Japan. Systematic analysis of available sources shows that the decision-makers drew a large number of different historical analogies-73 in all. This analysis takes a fresh look at the use of analogies regarding Iraqi reconstruction. We divide the period of April 2003 to June 2008 into four phases, in each of which a different analogy predominates-Afghanistan, Germany and Japan, the Cold War, and Vietnam. Analysis of the analogies embraced by five distinct groups within the Administration's decision-making team-nationalist hawks, neoconservatives, administrators of Iraq, realist internationalists and the president-clarifies the affinities and tensions amongst them.
650			_aUNITED STATES _xFOREIGN POLICY
650			_aMIDDLE EAST
650			_aIRAQ
773			_aDiplomacy & Statecraft : _gVol 29 No 2, June 2018, pp.298-327 (115)
598			_a IRAQ
856			_uhttps://doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2018.1453983 _zClick for text
945			_i61079-1001 _rY _sY
999			_c36357 _d36357