000 00809cam a2200133 4500
020 _a0674010515 (hbk.):
_c49.95 USD
100 1 _aFEAVER Peter D
245 0 _aArmed servants:
_bagency, oversight and civil-military relations /
_cby Peter D Feaver
260 _aCambridge, Mass. USA:
_bHarvard Univ Press,
_c2003
300 _a381p.
520 _aDevelops a new theory of civil-military relations in the United States in which the connection is best conceived as a principal-agent relationship, with the civilian executive directing and monitoring the actions of military agents. This is contrasted with Samual Huntington's professionalism based model of civil-military relations, and suggests that military obedience is not automatic.
650 _aUNITED STATES
_xCIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS
945 _i0015353
_rY
_sY
999 _c3375
_d3375