000			01627cam a2200145 4500
100	1		_aCATIGNANI Sergio
245			_aCoping with knowledge : _borganizational learning in the British Army? / _cSegio Catignani.
260			_c2014
520			_aStudy based on interviews with serving British Army personnel including infantry as well as representatives from Army lessons learned and training organizations. Found that experiences in Afghanistan were quickly shared on ad hoc informal basis but that this was inevitably piecemeal and had numerous limitations, whereas at the organizational level the process was very slow - doctrine is "almost out of date before it is published" and far too little time is devoted for example to counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine during any of the staff courses run at the JSCS. There was no shortage of information but it was often given too high clearance levels or rewritten for higher command rather than soldiers on the ground at company level down. The high tempo of operations and six-month deployments are further complicating factors. As a result a great deal of knowledge is lost or forgotten and the Army continues to repeat mistakes. Furthermore there is a risk that the Army system will revert to planning and educating for conventional manoeuvre warfare rather than COIN.
650			_aBRITISH ARMY _xORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING
650			_aBRITISH ARMY _xCOUNTERINSURGENCY _zAFGHANISTAN
773			_aJournal of Strategic Studies : _g Vol 37 No 1, February 2014, pp.30-64 (98)
856			_uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2013.776958 _zLink to full text.
945			_i43070-1001 _rY _sY
999			_c27724 _d27724