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001 19861
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022 _a9780700611096 (pbk.) :
100 1 _aKIESLING Eugenia C.
245 _aArming against Hitler : France and the limits of military planning /
_cEugenia C. Kiesling
260 _aLawrence KS :
_bUniversity Press of Kansas,
_c1996
300 _axiv, 260 p.
504 _aIncludes bibliographical references and index
520 _aKiesling is the first to show why the French had good reason to trust that their prewar defense policies, military doctrine, and combat forces would preserve the nation. Kiesling argues that France's devastating defeat was a consequence neither of blindness to the German military threat nor of paralysis in the face of it. Grimly aware of the need to prepare for another war with its arch enemy, French leaders created defense preparations and military doctrines in which they felt confident. Rather than simply focusing on what went wrong, Kiesling examines the fundamental logic of French defense planning within its cultural, institutional, political, and military contexts. In the process, she provides much new material about the inner workings of the French military, its relations with civilian leaders, its lack of adaptability, and its overreliance on an army reserve that was poorly organized, trained, and led. Ultimately, she makes a persuasive case for France's defense options and offers a useful warning about the utility of the "lessons of history." The lesson for contemporary policymakers and strategists, Kiesling suggests, is not that the French made mistakes but that nations and armies make policy and strategy under severe constraints. Her study forcefully reminds us how hindsight can blind us to the complexities of preparing for every next war.
598 _aFRENCH DEFENCE PLANNING, MILITARY DOCTRINE, COMBAT FORCES, SECOND WORLD WAR
650 _aWORLD WAR, 1939-1945
650 _aFRANCE
_xHISTORY
_xMILITARY
_x20TH CENTURY
650 _aMILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
_xFRANCE
942 _2ddc
_cBOOK
945 _i34733-1001
_rY
_sY
945 _i34733-2001
_rY
_sY
999 _c19861
_d19861