000 00945cam a2200145 4500
100 1 _aPARSI Mani
700 _aYETIV Steve A
245 _aUnequal contest :
_bIranian nuclear proliferation between economic and value symmetry /
_cMani Parsi and Steve A Yetiv
260 _c2008
520 _aConsiders why Iran is not agreeing to UN demands that it give up its uranium enrichment programme. Sanctions intended to persuade Iran to comply with the demands are likely to fail because Iran places a higher value on the programme than on what sanctions are obliging ti to forego. Recommends a reassessment of the various carrots and sticks to identify enticements sufficiently tempting and threats sufficiently credible to make cooperation a viable proposition.
650 _aIRAN
_xNUCLEAR PROGRAMMES
650 _aIRAN
_xSANCTIONS
773 _aContemporary Security Policy :
_gVol 29, No 2, August 2008, pp.332-337 (104)
945 _i24961-1001
_rY
_sY
999 _c10641
_d10641