The Political Economy of Minimum Wage Policies in South Korea and Taiwan: Decision- Making under Strong versus Weak Partisanship/ Ray Dongryul Kim and Chin-En Wu

This study conducts a systemic comparison of minimum wage decision-making in Korea and Taiwan. It demonstrates that Korea’s big-business-dominated economy builds confrontational labour–business relations to be exploited by political parties, resulting in partisan decisions on the minimum wage, to a greater extent than Taiwan’s more mixed economy. A large social divide based on the economic structure translates into a substantial partisan difference in minimum wage policies, when endorsed by the unique features of the minimum wage issue and carried out through the agents of the tripartite commission. As seen from the outcomes, a marked difference exists between Korea and Taiwan: Korea shows a dramatic fluctuation in annual minimum-wage increases, whereas Taiwan’s increases remain stable across different governments. Korean governments actively respond to their core constituencies, whether labour or business, while Taiwan governments seek to strike a balance.

WAGE, ECONOMY, TAIWAN, KOREA, DECISION-MAKING