Rebel mobilization through pandering: insincere leaders, framing, and exploitation of popular Grievances/ Kai M. Thaler

In civil wars, unpopular and violent rebel organizations sometimes gain support from politically motivated constituencies who should, by outside appearances, logically oppose such groups. I explain this through a logic in which self-interested, insincere rebel leaders pander to aggrieved civilian populations to mobilize them, presenting the rebel organization as empathizing with and offering solutions to popular grievances. Leaders exploit an information asymmetry about their true preferences to gain allegiance using cheap sociopolitical appeals, rather than more costly material incentives or coercion. I inductively develop the theory through a case study of Renamo in Mozambique and then probe the generalizability of the logic through case studies of the Nicaraguan Fuerza Democrática Nicaragüense and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, drawing on interviews and archival materials. This article explicates a previously undertheorized phenomenon in the study of rebel mobilization and demonstrates how apparent popular, voluntary support for rebels can be more tenuous than it appears.

SOCIAL, VIOLENT