State security forces and the initiation of interstate armed conflicts in autocracies/ Sung Min Yoon and Jungmoo Woo

Recent literature has analyzed why states established state security forces but has rarely analyzed the effect of state security forces on political phenomena. To fill this gap in part, this study explores the effect of an autocracy's state security forces on its decision to initiate an interstate armed conflict. We argue that an autocracy's state security forces increases the likelihood of its initiation of an interstate armed conflict because state security forces are likely to reduce costs of an armed conflict and increase the prospect of incomplete information situations in crisis bargaining. Specifically, an autocratic leader is less likely to suffer from domestic audience costs because state security armed forces consist of volunteers and thus the public is less likely to be concerned if they are sent abroad. Additionally, an autocracy's state armed forces increases the likelihood of incomplete information situations. This is because an autocracy's state armed forces are likely to reduce the level of military effectiveness in an armed conflict but the autocracy and its adversary are likely to disagree with its military effectiveness. The empirical results in this study supports this argument.

SECURITY, CONFLICT