The randomization of terrorist attacks/ Peter F Philips
Material type:
TextPublication details: 2010Subject(s):
In:
Defense & Security Analysis Vol 26, No.3 September 2010, pp.261-272 (94)Summary: This article is to explore the economic theoretical foundations of the idea that rational terrorists or terrorist organisations deliberately randomize their attacks, presumably to create more uncertainty and intimidation. The randomization of attacks can appear to promise higher amounts of political influence are obtained for each resource input.
| Item type | Current library | Call number | Copy number | Status | Date due | Barcode | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Journal Article | Mindef Library & Info Centre Journals | MISCELLANEOUS (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | 1 | Not for loan | 36526.1 |
This article is to explore the economic theoretical foundations of the idea that rational terrorists or terrorist organisations deliberately randomize their attacks, presumably to create more uncertainty and intimidation. The randomization of attacks can appear to promise higher amounts of political influence are obtained for each resource input.
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