(Mis)interpreting threats : a case study of the Korean war/ Alexander Ovodenko
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TextPublication details: 2007Subject(s):
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Security Studies Vol.16, No, 2, April-June 2007, pp.254-286 (118)Summary: This article examines the responses of the central intelligence agency (CIA) as a whole and several American national security officials to incoming information about the threat of Chinese intervention. There are two characteristics separate this article from much of the existing literature. First, this article concentrates on disparate American interpretations of the threat of Chinese intervention while seeking to explain the rationale underlying the commonly held conclusion that China would not enter the war. Second the analysis is rooted almost exclusively in the records of American officials who took part in the events it describes.
| Item type | Current library | Call number | Copy number | Status | Date due | Barcode | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Journal Article | Mindef Library & Info Centre Journals | KOREA (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | 1 | Not for loan | 22534-1001 |
This article examines the responses of the central intelligence agency (CIA) as a whole and several American national security officials to incoming information about the threat of Chinese intervention. There are two characteristics separate this article from much of the existing literature. First, this article concentrates on disparate American interpretations of the threat of Chinese intervention while seeking to explain the rationale underlying the commonly held conclusion that China would not enter the war. Second the analysis is rooted almost exclusively in the records of American officials who took part in the events it describes.
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