Winning wars
Material type:
TextPublication details: 2005Subject(s):
In:
Army Vol 55 No 4, April 2005, pp.25-32Summary: Retired U.S. Army Colonel argues that the U.S. Dept of Defense and the U.S. military itself prepared for and conducted a conventional attack on Iraq. Just as in Vietnam they were not prepared intellectually or doctrinally to deal with insurgency. This article identifies five counterinsurgency lessons from the Iraq War and Operation Iraqi Freedom.
| Item type | Current library | Call number | Copy number | Status | Date due | Barcode | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Journal Article | Mindef Library & Info Centre Journals | XX(18815.1) (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | 1 | Not for loan | 18815-1001 |
Retired U.S. Army Colonel argues that the U.S. Dept of Defense and the U.S. military itself prepared for and conducted a conventional attack on Iraq. Just as in Vietnam they were not prepared intellectually or doctrinally to deal with insurgency. This article identifies five counterinsurgency lessons from the Iraq War and Operation Iraqi Freedom.
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