Deterrence is not a credible strategy for cyberspace/ Michael P Fischerkeller
Material type: TextPublication details: 2017Subject(s): In: Orbis: Vol.61 No.3, Summer 2017, pp. 381-393 (44)Summary: The article highlights two arguments first, within cyberspce the protection or advancement of national interests cannot rest on deterrence as the central energy. Second, if the United States is to shape the development of international cyberspace norms it can do so only through active cyber operations that begin to shape the parameters of acceptable behavior.Item type | Current library | Call number | Copy number | Status | Date due | Barcode | |
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Journal Article | Mindef Library & Info Centre Journals | CYBERSPACE (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | 1 | Not for loan | 59513-1001 |
The article highlights two arguments first, within cyberspce the protection or advancement of national interests cannot rest on deterrence as the central energy. Second, if the United States is to shape the development of international cyberspace norms it can do so only through active cyber operations that begin to shape the parameters of acceptable behavior.
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