Personalised deterrence of cyber aggression/ Elisabeth Braw
Material type:
TextPublication details: 2020Subject(s): Online resources:
In:
RUSI Journal : March 2020, pp.48-54 (127)Summary: It highlights that adversary governments' practice of hiding behind proxies makes response and thus deterrence extraordinarily difficult. As a deterrence strategy adding to the existing deterrence directed against hostile actors, they propose 'personalised deterrence', with governments of targeted countries communicating directly to individual cyber attackers their intent to hold them personally responsible through denial of benefits and use of criminal law.
| Item type | Current library | Call number | Copy number | Status | Date due | Barcode | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Journal Article | Mindef Library & Info Centre Journals | CYBER (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | 1 | Not for loan | 65348-1001 |
It highlights that adversary governments' practice of hiding behind proxies makes response and thus deterrence extraordinarily difficult. As a deterrence strategy adding to the existing deterrence directed against hostile actors, they propose 'personalised deterrence', with governments of targeted countries communicating directly to individual cyber attackers their intent to hold them personally responsible through denial of benefits and use of criminal law.
IT, STRATEGY
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