Supporting allies in counterinsurgency : Britain and the Dhofar Rebellion / Walter C Ladwig
Material type:
TextPublication details: 2008Subject(s):
In:
Small Wars & Insurgencies Vol 19 No 1, March 2008, pp.74-104 (97)Summary: Between 1964 and 1975 with the help of a small group of British military officers, advisors, and trainers the Sultanate of Oman successfully overcame a Marxist insurgency. This paper considers the geographical and political situation in Oman, gives an overview of the insurgents, describes Oman's armed forces and their limitations, the assistance provided by Britain, the importance of using mainly Omani troops, the counterinsurgency campaign, and concludes with an assessment of the British effort. Notes that political development within Oman was the most important factor in the success of the counterinsurgency. Suggests that the experience of Dhofar could prove instructive in today's smaller scale conflicts as part of America's "long war" strategy.
| Item type | Current library | Call number | Copy number | Status | Date due | Barcode | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Journal Article | Mindef Library & Info Centre Journals | INSURGENCY & COUNTERINSURGENCY (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | 1 | Not for loan | 23875-1001 |
Browsing Mindef Library & Info Centre shelves, Shelving location: Journals Close shelf browser (Hides shelf browser)
| INSURGENCY Territoriality of radical Islam : comparative analysis of jihadist groups approach to territory/ | INSURGENCY Why a nineteenth-century study?/ | INSURGENCY Dealers and brokers in civil wars: why states delegate rebel support to conduit countries/ | INSURGENCY & COUNTERINSURGENCY Supporting allies in counterinsurgency : Britain and the Dhofar Rebellion / | INSURGENCY & COUNTERINSURGENCY An approach to counter threat operations within a counter insurgency environment / | INSURGENCY & COUNTERINSURGENCY Understanding proto-insurgencies / | INSURGENCY & COUNTERINSURGENCY The political and military effectiveness of Commonwealth forces in Confrontation 1963-66 / |
Between 1964 and 1975 with the help of a small group of British military officers, advisors, and trainers the Sultanate of Oman successfully overcame a Marxist insurgency. This paper considers the geographical and political situation in Oman, gives an overview of the insurgents, describes Oman's armed forces and their limitations, the assistance provided by Britain, the importance of using mainly Omani troops, the counterinsurgency campaign, and concludes with an assessment of the British effort. Notes that political development within Oman was the most important factor in the success of the counterinsurgency. Suggests that the experience of Dhofar could prove instructive in today's smaller scale conflicts as part of America's "long war" strategy.
There are no comments on this title.