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Fail-safe : North Korea's stability paradox / James A Foley

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FOLEY James A

Material type: Text

TextPublication details: 2007Subject(s):

In: Jane's Intelligence Review Vol 19 No 10, October 2007, pp.30-37Summary: As the six party negotiations on North Korea's nuclear programme continue, this article suggests that the most stable outcome for the country itself would be for the talks to fail altogether. The analysis uses country risk modeling to show the impact of various future scenarios.

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Item type	Current library	Call number	Copy number	Status	Date due	Barcode
Journal Article	Mindef Library & Info Centre Journals	KOREA (Browse shelf(Opens below))	1	Not for loan		22882-1001

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Previous	KOREA Nukes in the balance : the effects of proliferation on regional security/	KOREA Preparing for the inevitable: nuclear signaling for regional nuclear crises/	KOREA The North Korea nuclear crisis and U.S strategy in Northeast Asia/	KOREA Fail-safe : North Korea's stability paradox /	KOREA ROK armed forces: effective instrument of national policy/	KOREA North Korea's future : what Pyongyang, seoul, and Washington could learn from east Europe, the former USSR and China/	KOREA North Korea's nuclear shut-down continues/	Next

As the six party negotiations on North Korea's nuclear programme continue, this article suggests that the most stable outcome for the country itself would be for the talks to fail altogether. The analysis uses country risk modeling to show the impact of various future scenarios.

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