Regime insecurity and international cooperation: explaining China's compromises in territorial disputes / by M Taylor Fravel
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TextPublication details: 2005Subject(s):
In:
International Security Vol 30 No 2, Fall 2005, pp.46-83 (68)Summary: Argues that regime insecurity, arising from internal threats such as rebellions and legitimacy crises, is the best explanation of why China has been willing to compromise on or postpone settlement of international disputes.
| Item type | Current library | Call number | Copy number | Status | Date due | Barcode | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Journal Article | Mindef Library & Info Centre Journals | XX(19597.1) (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | 1 | Not for loan | 19597-1001 |
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Argues that regime insecurity, arising from internal threats such as rebellions and legitimacy crises, is the best explanation of why China has been willing to compromise on or postpone settlement of international disputes.
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